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and personal preferences, but you
can’t say they are wrong.
Nor may you critique, challenge,
praise, or fault them. It would be like
trying to keep score in a game with
no rules or putting a criminal on
trial when there are no laws.
To illustrate, relativists cannot
object on moral grounds to any
form of racism or cultural imperial-
ism if those actions are consistent
with the perpetrator’s personal
moral understanding of what is
right and good. What sense can be
made of the judgment “apartheid is
wrong” spoken by a relativist? What
just ideation is there to intervene?
Certainly not human rights, for
there are no objective rights in rela-
tivism because there are no rights or
wrongs of any kind. As former
Attorney General Ramsey Clarke
once said, one person’s terrorist is
another person’s freedom fighter. It
would be inconsistent for the same
car to sport the bumper stickers
“Pro-choice” and “End Apartheid.”
Relativism is the ultimate pro-
choice position, because it legit-
imizes every personal choice—even
the choice to be a racist.
Nor can lying be wrong, even if
the lie perverts justice and con-
demns an innocent person. In fact,
there is no real difference between
one who is guilty and one who is
innocent because in relativism, guilt
and innocence are meaningless dis-
tinctions.
The notion of a promise is also
empty. A promise is not just a state-
ment of intent about the future but
also entails the moral obligation to
fulfill the intent. That’s why chang-
ing one’s mind is different from
breaking a promise, a distinction
lost in relativism. No contract could
ever have any moral force. Marriage
vows would be empty words, pro-
viding no comfort or protection for
spouses and no stability for fami-
lies.
There can be no accountability in
relativism. Those who answer to
themselves ultimately answer to no
one of consequence. And this makes
it impossible to distinguish relativis-
tic morality from self-interest or
ethical egoism.
Further, if morality is an individ-
ual call, and if moral wrong is the
kind of error for which punishment
seems to be justified, then all pun-
ishment would have to be approved
by the individual responsible for the
“immoral” conduct.
This is the first law of relativism:
When right or wrong are a matter of
personal choice, we surrender the
privilege of making moral judg-
ments on others’ actions. But if our
moral intuition rebels against these
consequences of relativism—if we’re
sure that some things must be wrong
and that some judgments against the
conduct of others are justified—
then relativism is false.
48
oral accountability, evil,
praise, blame, justice, fair-
ness, moral improvement,
moral discourse, and toler-
ance all seem to be concepts
that have meaning apparent to our
moral common sense. Each is justi-
fied by moral intuition, yet rela-
tivism renders them all meaningless.
If these moral notions are valid yet
are inconsistent with moral rela-
tivism, then relativism must be false.
There are at least seven flaws of
relativism that point to its bank-
ruptcy.
Relativists can’t accuse others of
wrongdoing. Relativism makes it
impossible to criticize the behavior of
others because it ultimately denies
such a thing as wrongdoing. If you
believe morality is a matter of per-
sonal definition, then you surrender
the possibility of making moral judg-
ments about others’ actions, no mat-
ter how offensive they are to your
intuitive sense of right or wrong. You
may express your emotions, tastes,
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Hitler did anything wrong? If there
is no God, then the people that
murdered your wife and kids did
nothing wrong.”
The approach many relativists
take at this point is confused. First,
they say that the Holocaust was evil
and ask why God would allow such
depravity. Later, when the tables
turn and their own behavior is in
question, they argue that morality is
merely a matter of opinion. This
reduces their earlier objection to,
How could a good God allow things
that are contrary to my opinion?
Moral relativism and objective
evil are strange bedfellows. They
couldn’t possibly both be true at the
same time. If morality is ultimately a
matter of personal tastes, like prefer-
ring steak over broccoli or brussels
sprouts, the argument against God’s
existence based on the problem of
evil vanishes. Relativists must sur-
render this objection.
If, however, it seems legitimate to
raise the issue of evil in the world,
then relativism can’t be true.
Relativists can’t place blame or
accept praise. Relativism renders the
concepts of praise and blame mean-
ingless, because no external standard
of measurement defines what
should be applauded or condemned.
Without absolutes, nothing is
ultimately bad, deplorable, tragic, or
worthy of blame. Neither is anything
ultimately good, honorable, noble,
or worthy of praise. It’s all lost in a
twilight zone of moral nothingness.
Relativists are almost always
inconsistent here. They seek to avoid
blame but readily accept praise. C. S.
Lewis notes that our habits of wel-
coming praise and of making ex-
cuses to avoid blame evidence our
deep commitment to objective
morality: “The truth is, we believe in
decency so much—we feel the Rule
or Law pressing on us so—that we
cannot bear to face the fact that we
are breaking it, and consequently we
50
Relativists can’t complain about
the problem of evil. The reality of
evil in the world is one of the first
objections raised against the exis-
tence of God. The common argu-
ment says that if God is absolutely
powerful and ultimately good, He
would deal with evil. But since evil
exists, God appears too frail to
oppose it or too sinister to care.
The entire objection hinges on
the observation that true evil exists.
The only way one can have this com-
plaint about God is if evil is “out
there” as an objective feature of the
world. Evil can’t be real if morals are
relative to the subject.
Relativism is inconsistent with
the concept that true moral evil
exists because it denies that some
things are objectively wrong. Evil as
a value judgment marks a departure
from some standard of moral per-
fection. But if there is no standard,
there is no departure. As C. S. Lewis
notes, a portrait is a good or bad
likeness depending on how it com-
pares with the “perfect” original.
Relativism denies such a stan-
dard. This was a serious problem for
Lewis: “My argument against God
was that the universe seemed so
cruel and unjust. But how had I got
this idea of just and unjust? A man
does not call a line crooked unless he
has some idea of a straight line.
What was I comparing this universe
with when I called it unjust? . . . Of
course, I could have given up my
idea of justice by saying it was noth-
ing but a private idea of my own. But
if I did that, then my argument
against God collapsed, too—for the
argument depended on saying that
the world was really unjust, not sim-
ply that it did not happen to please
my private fancies.”1
If relativism is true, the objection
against God based on evil vanishes.
There is no true evil to discuss, only
differing opinions about what is
pleasant or unpleasant, desired or
not desired.
This point was made clear in the
movie The Quarrel. The main char-
acters, Hersh and Chiam, grew up
together but separated because of a
dispute about God and evil. Then
came the Holocaust, and each
thought the other had perished.
Reunited by chance after the war,
they become embroiled once again
in their boyhood quarrel. Hersh,
now a rabbi, offers this challenge to
the secularist Chiam: “If there’s
nothing in the universe that’s higher
than human beings, then what’s
morality? Well, it’s a matter of opin-
ion. I like milk; you like meat. Hitler
likes to kill people; I like to save
them. Who’s to say which is better?
“Do you begin to see the horror
of this? If there is no Master of the
universe, then who’s to say that
Relativism is inconsistent with the concept that true moral evil
exists because it denies that some things are objectively wrong.
Evil as a value judgment marks a departure from some standard of
moral perfection. But if there is no standard, there is no departure.
As C. S. Lewis notes, a portrait is a good or bad likeness depending




Beckwith and Koukl: Relativism's Seven Fatal Flaws
Published by Digital Commons @ Andrews University, 2005
51
Hitler did anything wrong? If there
is no God, then the people that
murdered your wife and kids did
nothing wrong.”
The approach many relativists
take at this point is confused. First,
they say that the Holocaust was evil
and ask why God would allow such
depravity. Later, when the tables
turn and their own behavior is in
question, they argue that morality is
merely a matter of opinion. This
reduces their earlier objection to,
How could a good God allow things
that are contrary to my opinion?
Moral relativism and objective
evil are strange bedfellows. They
couldn’t possibly both be true at the
same time. If morality is ultimately a
matter of personal tastes, like prefer-
ring steak over broccoli or brussels
sprouts, the argument against God’s
existence based on the problem of
evil vanishes. Relativists must sur-
render this objection.
If, however, it seems legitimate to
raise the issue of evil in the world,
then relativism can’t be true.
Relativists can’t place blame or
accept praise. Relativism renders the
concepts of praise and blame mean-
ingless, because no external standard
of measurement defines what
should be applauded or condemned.
Without absolutes, nothing is
ultimately bad, deplorable, tragic, or
worthy of blame. Neither is anything
ultimately good, honorable, noble,
or worthy of praise. It’s all lost in a
twilight zone of moral nothingness.
Relativists are almost always
inconsistent here. They seek to avoid
blame but readily accept praise. C. S.
Lewis notes that our habits of wel-
coming praise and of making ex-
cuses to avoid blame evidence our
deep commitment to objective
morality: “The truth is, we believe in
decency so much—we feel the Rule
or Law pressing on us so—that we
cannot bear to face the fact that we
are breaking it, and consequently we
50
Relativists can’t complain about
the problem of evil. The reality of
evil in the world is one of the first
objections raised against the exis-
tence of God. The common argu-
ment says that if God is absolutely
powerful and ultimately good, He
would deal with evil. But since evil
exists, God appears too frail to
oppose it or too sinister to care.
The entire objection hinges on
the observation that true evil exists.
The only way one can have this com-
plaint about God is if evil is “out
there” as an objective feature of the
world. Evil can’t be real if morals are
relative to the subject.
Relativism is inconsistent with
the concept that true moral evil
exists because it denies that some
things are objectively wrong. Evil as
a value judgment marks a departure
from some standard of moral per-
fection. But if there is no standard,
there is no departure. As C. S. Lewis
notes, a portrait is a good or bad
likeness depending on how it com-
pares with the “perfect” original.
Relativism denies such a stan-
dard. This was a serious problem for
Lewis: “My argument against God
was that the universe seemed so
cruel and unjust. But how had I got
this idea of just and unjust? A man
does not call a line crooked unless he
has some idea of a straight line.
What was I comparing this universe
with when I called it unjust? . . . Of
course, I could have given up my
idea of justice by saying it was noth-
ing but a private idea of my own. But
if I did that, then my argument
against God collapsed, too—for the
argument depended on saying that
the world was really unjust, not sim-
ply that it did not happen to please
my private fancies.”1
If relativism is true, the objection
against God based on evil vanishes.
There is no true evil to discuss, only
differing opinions about what is
pleasant or unpleasant, desired or
not desired.
This point was made clear in the
movie The Quarrel. The main char-
acters, Hersh and Chiam, grew up
together but separated because of a
dispute about God and evil. Then
came the Holocaust, and each
thought the other had perished.
Reunited by chance after the war,
they become embroiled once again
in their boyhood quarrel. Hersh,
now a rabbi, offers this challenge to
the secularist Chiam: “If there’s
nothing in the universe that’s higher
than human beings, then what’s
morality? Well, it’s a matter of opin-
ion. I like milk; you like meat. Hitler
likes to kill people; I like to save
them. Who’s to say which is better?
“Do you begin to see the horror
of this? If there is no Master of the
universe, then who’s to say that
Relativism is inconsistent with the concept that true moral evil
exists because it denies that some things are objectively wrong.
Evil as a value judgment marks a departure from some standard of
moral perfection. But if there is no standard, there is no departure.
As C. S. Lewis notes, a portrait is a good or bad likeness depending




Perspective Digest, Vol. 10 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/pd/vol10/iss2/5
53
treaties do not matter,” says Lewis,
“but then, next minute, they spoil
their case by saying that the particu-
lar treaty they want to break was an
unfair one. But if treaties do not
matter, and if there is no such thing
as Right and Wrong . . . what is the
difference between a fair treaty and
an unfair one?”3
If relativism is true, then there is
no such thing as justice or fairness.
Both concepts depend on an objec-
tive standard of what is right. If the
notions of justice and fairness make
sense, however, then relativism is
defeated.
Relativists can’t improve their
morality. With moral relativism,
moral improvement or reform is
impossible. Relativists can change
their personal ethics, but they can
never become better people.
How can one get “better”? Moral
reform implies an objective rule of
conduct as the standard to which we
ought to aspire. But this rule is
exactly what relativists deny. If there
is no better way, there can be no
improvement.
Further, there is no motive to
improve. Relativism destroys the
moral impulse that compels people to
rise above themselves because there is
no “above” to rise to, ethically speak-
ing. Why change our moral point of
view if it serves our self-interest and
feels good for the time being?
In relativism, by definition one’s
ethics can never be more “moral” at
one time than another. Morals can
change, but they can never improve.
If, however, moral improvement
seems to be a concept that makes
sense, then relativism can’t be true.
Relativists can’t hold meaningful
moral discussions. Relativism makes
it impossible to discuss morality.
What’s there to talk about? A mean-
ingful ethical dialogue can be held
only when moral principles are seen
as universal action guides.
Ethical discourse involves com-
paring the merits of one view with
another to find which is best. But if
morals are entirely relative and all
views are equal, then no way of
thinking is better than another. No
moral position can be judged ade-
quate or deficient, unreasonable,
unacceptable, or even barbaric.
A. J. Ayer agrees, arguing that ethi-
cal statements are meaningless 
because they are not empirically veri-
fiable: “We find that argument is pos-
sible on moral questions only if some
system of values is presupposed.”4
Ayer’s own view, called emo-
tivism, denies that ethical statements
are anything more than raw expres-
sions of emotion. As such, they have
52
try to shift the responsibility. For
you notice that it is only for our bad
behavior that we find all these expla-
nations. It is only our bad temper
that we put down to being tired or
worried or hungry; we put our good
temper down to ourselves.”2
B. F. Skinner argues in Beyond
Freedom and Dignity that humans
are simply biological machines
whose conduct is determined by a
mixture of biology and environ-
ment. In Walden II, his description
of the brave new world founded on
principles of behavior modification,
the concepts of praise and blame are
portrayed as completely meaning-
less. Morality is a fiction.
In like fashion, relativists must
remove the words praise and blame
from their vocabularies. But if the
notions of praise and blame are
valid, then relativism must be false.
Relativists can’t make charges of
unfairness or injustice. Justice and
fairness are two more concepts that
don’t make sense in a world devoid
of moral absolutes. Under rela-
tivism, these notions are incoherent
for two reasons.
First, the words themselves have
no meaning. Both concepts dictate
that people receive equal treatment
based on an external standard of
what is right. This outside standard,
though, is the very thing repudiated
by relativists. After all, how can there
be justice or fairness if there are no
moral requirements to be just or
fair? It’s not wrong to punish an
innocent person, nor is it immoral
to release the guilty.
Second, there is no possibility of
true moral guilt. Justice entails,
among other things, punishing those
who are guilty. Guilt, however, de-
pends on blame, which we have seen
cannot exist. If nothing is ultimately
immoral, there is no blame and sub-
sequently no guilt worthy of punish-
ment.
People give away their true intu-
itions about justice and fairness by
their language. “A nation may say
Further, there is no motive to improve. Relativism destroys 
the moral impulse that compels people to rise above themselves
because there is no “above” to rise to, ethically speaking.
Why change our moral point of view if it serves our self-interest
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their opinions or behavior.”7
If there are no objective moral
rules, however, there can be no rule
that requires tolerance as a moral
principle that applies equally to all.
In fact, if there are no moral ab-
solutes, why be tolerant at all? Why
not force my morality on others if
it’s in my self-interest and my per-
sonal ethics allow it?
Relativists violate their own prin-
ciple of tolerance when they do not
tolerate the views of those whose
morality is nonrelativistic. They only
tolerate those who hold their ethical
viewpoint. They are, therefore, just
as intolerant as any objectivist ap-
pears to be.
The principle of tolerance is for-
eign to relativism. If, however, tol-
erance seems to be a virtue and we
owe a measure of respect to those
who differ with us, then relativism
can’t be true.
The Sum of All Flaws
What kind of world would it be if
relativism were true? It would be a
world in which nothing is wrong—
nothing is considered evil or good,
nothing worthy of praise or blame.
It would be a world in which justice
and fairness are meaningless con-
cepts, in which there would be no
accountability, no possibility of
moral improvement, no moral dis-
course. And it would be a world in
which there is no tolerance.
Moral relativism produces this
kind of world. The late Dr. Francis
Schaeffer’s remark could well apply
to relativists, who “have both feet
firmly planted in mid-air.”
54
no more content than words like
“Wow!” or “Yuck!” “If a sentence
makes no statement at all, there is
obviously no sense in asking
whether what it says is true or false.
And we have seen that sentences
which simply express moral judg-
ments do not say anything. They are
pure expressions of feeling and as
such do not come under the cate-
gory of truth and falsehood.”5
If Ayer is right, then moral educa-
tion is impossible, because the words
themselves are meaningless. One
can’t even have a moral dispute. Yet
quarrels seem to entail meaningful
moral discussions, as Lewis points
out: “Quarreling means trying to
show that the other man is in the
wrong. And there would be no sense
in trying to do that unless you and he
had some sort of agreement as to
what Right and Wrong are; just as
there would be no sense in saying
that a footballer had committed a
foul unless there was some agree-
ment about the rules of football.”6
If ethical disputes make sense
only when morals are objective, then
relativism can be lived out consis-
tently only in silence. For this rea-
son, it’s rare to meet a thoroughgo-
ing relativist. Most are quick to
impose moral rules like, It’s wrong
to push your morality on others.
The only course of action truly
consistent with moral relativism is
complete silence. If you view all
morality as relative and you’re con-
sistent, you can’t ever make a moral
recommendation.
This puts relativists in an unten-
able position, caught coming and
going. If they speak, they surrender
their relativism. If they do not speak,
they surrender their humanity. It’s
inhuman to be mute in the face of
egregious evil, to be silent in the
presence of flagrant injustice.
Those who believe that ethical
truth is relative cannot say anything
further that is morally meaningful.
But if the notion of moral discourse
makes sense intuitively, then moral
relativism is false.
Relativists can’t promote the
obligation of tolerance. Finally, there
is no tolerance in relativism, because
the relativists’ moral obligation to be
tolerant is self-refuting.
The principle of tolerance is con-
sidered one of the key virtues of rel-
ativism. Morals are individual, rela-
tivists argue, and therefore we ought
to tolerate the viewpoints of others
and not pass judgment on their
behavior and attitudes.
It should be obvious that this
attempt fails through contradiction.
To relativists, tolerance means, “I
(morally) ought to tolerate the
moral opinions and behavior of oth-
ers who disagree with me. I (mor-
ally) should not try to interfere with
What kind of world would it be if relativism were true? 
It would be a world in which nothing is wrong—nothing is 
considered evil or good, nothing worthy of praise or blame. It
would be a world in which justice and fairness are meaningless
concepts, in which there would be no accountability, no 
possibility of moral improvement, no moral discourse.
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their opinions or behavior.”7
If there are no objective moral
rules, however, there can be no rule
that requires tolerance as a moral
principle that applies equally to all.
In fact, if there are no moral ab-
solutes, why be tolerant at all? Why
not force my morality on others if
it’s in my self-interest and my per-
sonal ethics allow it?
Relativists violate their own prin-
ciple of tolerance when they do not
tolerate the views of those whose
morality is nonrelativistic. They only
tolerate those who hold their ethical
viewpoint. They are, therefore, just
as intolerant as any objectivist ap-
pears to be.
The principle of tolerance is for-
eign to relativism. If, however, tol-
erance seems to be a virtue and we
owe a measure of respect to those
who differ with us, then relativism
can’t be true.
The Sum of All Flaws
What kind of world would it be if
relativism were true? It would be a
world in which nothing is wrong—
nothing is considered evil or good,
nothing worthy of praise or blame.
It would be a world in which justice
and fairness are meaningless con-
cepts, in which there would be no
accountability, no possibility of
moral improvement, no moral dis-
course. And it would be a world in
which there is no tolerance.
Moral relativism produces this
kind of world. The late Dr. Francis
Schaeffer’s remark could well apply
to relativists, who “have both feet
firmly planted in mid-air.”
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no more content than words like
“Wow!” or “Yuck!” “If a sentence
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such do not come under the cate-
gory of truth and falsehood.”5
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wrong. And there would be no sense
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what Right and Wrong are; just as
there would be no sense in saying
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ment about the rules of football.”6
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Relativists can’t promote the
obligation of tolerance. Finally, there
is no tolerance in relativism, because
the relativists’ moral obligation to be
tolerant is self-refuting.
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to tolerate the viewpoints of others
and not pass judgment on their
behavior and attitudes.
It should be obvious that this
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To relativists, tolerance means, “I
(morally) ought to tolerate the
moral opinions and behavior of oth-
ers who disagree with me. I (mor-
ally) should not try to interfere with
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It would be a world in which nothing is wrong—nothing is 
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